The first was khổng lồ fight stubbornly until the end and refuse to lớn surrender khổng lồ the Ming Dynasty. The second was lớn surrender unconditionally.

The third was khổng lồ skillfully submit lớn the Chinese khổng lồ keep the peace by reducing their desire to lớn disrupt the peace và harmony in the region.

If they had chosen the first option, there would have been bloodshed và fatalities on both sides. Also, this option contrasts with the efforts of the Mac dynasty khổng lồ build a peaceful và prosperous life for their people. Furthermore, the Ming-Ho dynasty war (1407–1427) at the beginning of the fifteenth century proved lớn be a valuable lesson in the dangers of fighting the Chinese. The Mac dynasty understood that their regime was newly established, and there was little public support for conflict. They were not nearly strong enough lớn compete against the Chinese.

The second option would have meant surrendering without taking action to khuyến mãi with the threat of external invasion & accepting total dependence on China. If the Mac dynasty chose this option, they would have eradicated their lineage, denied the efforts of generations khổng lồ build the dynasty, và trampled on the independence of the nation that the predecessors had built. If this option had been chosen, the Mac dynasty would not have continued ruling for much longer & would eventually have been wiped out.

Therefore, the Mac dynasty could only choose the third option. The Mac dynasty was not strong enough lớn defeat the Chinese; it was inevitable that the Mac dynasty had lớn be subdued in order to deter the ambitions of invasion by the Chinese state. Many strongly criticize the Mac dynasty’s humility and argue that it was an act of treason. Representatives of this line of reasoning are famous scholars such as Ngo yêu thích Lien & Le-dynasty historians in Complete Annals of dẻo Viet (Lien, 1993) or Tran trong Kim in Outline History of Vietnam (Kim, 2008). Even, many Vietnamese historians placed the Mac dynasty in the position of a puppet regime along with the Ho dynasty, the Tay Son dynasty (Historiography Institute of Nguyen Dynasty, 1998; Lien, 1968; Kim, 1971). What is the nature of this problem? What are the reasons for the choice of policy of the Mac dynasty in diplomatic relations with đài loan trung quốc at this time? Did the modesty & flexibility on the border and territorial aspects of the Mac Dynasty in its relations with đài loan trung quốc at that time threaten the supreme principle of national independence and peace for the people or not? Those are the important issues that this article focuses on analyzing.

The position & correlation of forces between dai Viet and china in the first half of the sixteenth century

In 1527, after overthrowing the Primal Le dynasty, Mac Dang Dung was crowned King, marking the start of a new dynasty in dẻo Viet known as the Mac dynasty. Taking nguồn based on destroying the Primal Le dynasty was challenging because the Primal Le dynasty had won the hearts of the people and had protected and liberated the country. Furthermore, Mac Dang Dung was a military mandarin who had devoted much of his life lớn the Primal Le dynasty. Naturally, Mac Dang Dung’s attempt to lớn overthrow the Primal Le Dynasty met with resistance, especially from the former mandarins of the Primal Le dynasty and the Ming dynasty (China). During the first phase (1527–1541), the Ming dynasty did not acknowledge the official existence of the Mac dynasty in dai Viet, & the Mac dynasty faced opposing actions (both enticement và military threat) of the Ming dynasty. Therefore, it is apparent that the Mac dynasty was in a challenging situation when it was founded. However, for the first 65 years (1527–1592), the Mac dynasty was still considered a legal dynasty. The legitimacy in the first phase helped the Mac dynasty reform politics, the economy, culture, và education. They also achieved considerable success in civil security by creating a peaceful life for their citizens. These actions led khổng lồ the enthusiastic support of people for the Mac dynasty, especially from northern people.

Meanwhile, after the Le dynasty was re-established in 1533 (the Revival Le dynasty), conflicts between the Mac và Revival Le dynasties became fierce, developing into the South–North War for more than 50 years of dẻo Viet (1527–1592). The Revival Le dynasty often sent people lớn the Ming dynasty to denounce the Mac dynasty và ask for reinforcements to lớn fight the Mac dynasty. For example, in 1529, Trinh Ngung & Trinh Ngang, the former mandarins of the Primal Le Dynasty, came to the Ming Dynasty to lớn denounce Mac Thai khổng lồ as an invader và asked for reinforcements khổng lồ repel him (Don, 1976, pp. 331–332; Historiography Institute of Nguyen Dynasty, 2007b, pp. 102–103). In 1533, when the Revival Le Dynasty had not recovered the North of dai Viet, King Le Trang Tong (1514–1548) sent Admiral Trinh Duy Lieu to china on a Guangdong merchant ship khổng lồ ask china to invade the Mac dynasty khổng lồ punish Mac Thai lớn for stealing the throne. However, at the time, the Ming court was skeptical & did not entirely believe the claims. (Historiography Institute of Nguyen Dynasty, 2007b, p 109). Not receiving news from Trinh Duy Lieu’s delegation, in 1536, King Le Trang Tong continued to ask Trinh Vien to lớn follow Yunnan’s route lớn the Ming rulers lớn tell them about the incident và to ask the Ming army to lớn attack the Mac dynasty (Historiography Institute of Nguyen Dynasty, 2007b, p 110). In 1537, Uong Van Thinh, the patrol of Yunnan, also invoked the former officer of the Primal Le Dynasty, Vu Van Uyen. After Mac Thai to took the throne, Vu Van Uyen brought 10,000 soldiers from Tuyen quang quẻ province (Dai Viet) to join the Ming army. Vu Van Uyen also gave Uong Van Thinh a map to assist with the attack (Thao, 2010, p 199). Furthermore, on April 22, 1538, the Ming Dynasty was given specific information on the number of troops và the best way to lớn attack the Mac dynasty by the Revival Le dynasty (Thao, 2010, pp. 203–204).

On the side of the Ming dynasty, in 1534, the Ming dynasty sent two Generals, Cuu Loan & Mao Bowen, khổng lồ lead troops to the border, claiming lớn attack the Mac dynasty. By February 1537, the Ming dynasty continued lớn allow General Cuu Loan’s army khổng lồ move close khổng lồ the border, but once again, the Ming was hesitant to lớn enter dẻo Viet (Don, 1976, phường 335). However, from that, the relationship between the Ming and the Mac dynasties became tenser. In April of the same year, the Senior Lieutenant of the Revival Le dynasty và the Senior Lieutenant-General of the Ming dynasty discussed preparing an expedition to lớn punish the Mac dynasty, together lớn accuse Mac Thai to of killing the king of the Primal Le dynasty & usurping the throne. Even the king of the Ming Dynasty offered prizes everywhere for those who caught Mac thai To and his son (Thao, 2010, pp. 195–196). At the same time, the Ming dynasty chose talented people lớn use and mobilize appropriate people for the invasion of dẻo Viet (Thao, 2010, phường 189; Li Guoxiang, 1991, p. 794).

So, during this time, the Ming dynasty used military strength that acted as a big stick, along with threatening rhetoric designed to repress the opponent’s spirit into surrender. They fundamentally wanted to lớn force the Mac dynasty into submission to lớn avoid the occurrence of war. Clearly, this kích hoạt meant that the Mac dynasty had two choices: one was war with the Ming dynasty, and the other was the humility of surrender.

Meanwhile, many other continuous difficulties came lớn the Mac dynasty. In April 1537, a Mac General, Tay An, the head of seven districts in Thanh Hoa, brought troops lớn Ai Lao with King Le (Lien, 1993, p 120). In September of the same year, Vu Van Uyen, a former servant of the Primal Le dynasty, led about ten thousand troops to surrender lớn the Ming Dynasty. Not only that, Vu Van Uyen also gave the Ming dynasty a bản đồ to attack the Mac dynasty (Thao, 2010, phường 199). Next, Vu Van Uyen himself brought troops to fight the Mac army, capturing the border gate và the barracks (Thao, 2010, p. 203).

Moreover, the military forces of Lao Qua và Xa Ly, Bat Bach—which were three small countries located in the West and Northwest of dẻo Viet were ready to lớn join forces with the Ming Dynasty lớn attack dẻo Viet. The Ming dynasty agreed khổng lồ let them govern any place that they captured. (Thao, 2010, p 202).

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Furthermore, dẻo Viet was also at risk of encroachment from the sea by Champa. Champa became a significant player in the Ming plan khổng lồ take over dẻo Viet. On April 6, 1538, the Kham Lam Hy Nguyen officer presented to lớn Emperor Jiajing the strategy of using Champa to attack dẻo Viet from the sea (Thao, 2010, pp. 211–212).

In the context when the threat of opposition to overthrow the Mac dynasty from the Revival Le dynasty was always permanent và the ambition to lớn expand from the north of the Chinese feudal dynasties never ceased, plus the many other difficulties mentioned above, it is understandable that the Mac family could not have enough strength khổng lồ cope with these “heavyweight” opponents at the same time. The Mac Dynasty realized the need for assistance from a force “strong enough” to lớn curb the “ambition” of the Revival Le dynasty. In that isolated context, on the journey khổng lồ find an ally besides the Ming dynasty, who could the Mac dynasty rely on at this time? Therefore, the Mac dynasty chose lớn subdue the Ming dynasty và become a thành viên of the Chinese tribute system. Moreover, the Ming dynasty itself was also gradually weakening at this time. Therefore, although many times they wanted khổng lồ expand the power khổng lồ the South to lớn show off their prestige when the internal government was not peaceful, the Ming dynasty itself was trying khổng lồ maintain a calm position in relations with surrounding countries, including dẻo Viet. Therefore, more than ever, the Ming dynasty always wanted khổng lồ take advantage of the division within dẻo Viet to lớn weaken the Vietnamese country’s potential to prepare for a long-term expansion scheme. However, it did not immediately use force to lớn cause war.

If we divide Premodern Sino-Vietnamese relations into four states of interaction: Strong China/Weak Vietnam, Weak china / Strong Vietnam, Strong China/Strong Vietnam (Anderson, 2013, pp. 259–280), & Weak China/Weak Vietnam, Vietnam’s submission to đài loan trung quốc only takes place when the two countries are in the second state (Weak China/Strong Vietnam), third state (Strong China/Strong Vietnam) & the 4th state (Weak China/Weak Vietnam). Only when in the state of 2, 3, or 4 will đài loan trung quốc become Vietnam’s “benevolent big brother” (Tuong Vu, 2016, phường 53). Apparently, in the period 1527–1541, the relationship between the Mac and the Ming dynasties was in this 4th state (Weak China/Weak Vietnam). Therefore, after a period of not recognizing the Mac dynasty until 1541, the Ming dynasty did not refuse the Mac dynasty’s submission, officially recognized the Mac dynasty, & conferred the title of General Governor lớn the head of the Mac Dynasty. This was a ploy khổng lồ turn the Mac Dynasty into a relative counterbalance in the war against the Revival Le dynasty, & maintained long-term division in dai Viet.

The nature of the relationship forms the basis for evaluating the true nature of the diplomatic activities of the Mac dynasty at that time. However, what were the consequences of the relationship? Did the relationship between the vassal (Mac dynasty) & the suzerain (the Ming dynasty) help the Mac dynasty withstand the challenges they faced at the time? How did that relationship affect the independence và autonomy of the nation and people?

Em gái nhà chỉ huy Triều Tiên năm ngoái đã kết bạn với nam nhi của Choe Ryong Hae, trong những cận thần của Kim Jong Un.

Hình ảnh bên phải cho thấy thêm em gái nhà chỉ huy Kim Jong Un, Kim Yo Jung, treo nhẫn nghỉ ngơi ngón áp út. Ảnh: Yonhap

“Kim Yo Jong, phó quản trị Đảng Lao rượu cồn Triều Tiên kết giao với con trai của Choe Ryong Hae, túng bấn thư đảng”, Yonhap ngày 2/1 dẫn mối cung cấp tin an toàn và tin cậy ở Trung Quốc.

Choe được coi là người quyền lực thứ nhì ở quốc gia bí ẩn nhất cầm giới, sau nhà lãnh đạo Kim Jong Un.

Ông Choe có hai nam nhi và một con gái, theo một mối cung cấp tin khác. Người đàn ông thứ hai, Choe Song, đó là chồng của em gái Kim Jong Un. Choe tuy vậy được đến là khoảng ngoài 30 nhưng quá trình của người bọn ông này không được huyết lộ.

Hôm qua, truyền thông media Triều Tiên đăng hình hình ảnh Kim Yo Jong tháp tùng anh trai thăm một trại trẻ con mồ côi sống Bình Nhưỡng trong đợt năm mới. Fan ta phát hiện nay cô đeo nhẫn, có vẻ như là nhẫn cưới, bên trên bàn tay trái.

Kim Yo Jong trong năm này 28 tuổi. Cô là phó chủ tịch Đảng Lao động Triều Tiên.

Kim Jong Un cùng em gái thăm trại trẻ mồ côi sinh sống Bình Nhưỡng

Thông tấn xã tw Triều Tiên (KCNA) ngày 2/1 tin báo sau khi bài diễn văn kính chào mừng năm mới tết đến được phân phát đi, nhà lãnh đạo Triều Tiên cùng em gái sẽ thăm một trại con trẻ mồ côi.

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